Let us play a little on Libyan and Nigerian factors before we get se-rious here.
The Bible appears to have started this write up and at the same time concluded it. In the book of Proverbs 21:20, it says:
“Precious treasure and oil in a wise man’s dwelling, but the foolish man de¬vours it”
The question on the lips of everyone today is: Will the price of oil price ever return to the famous and generous $120 per barrel, so that prodigal sons will con¬tinue to enjoy and waste resources of many nations on celebrations of wealth, with licence from the IMF that they should spend more in diffi cult times?
Otherwise, how will one explain the golden gun in the hands of the former Libya president in his last days? What was the cost and of what signifi cance was it to the territorial security of the poor people of Libya? How many of such golden guns were bought as gifts for oth¬er prodigal presidents when they were visiting?
A short report from the Financial Times of South Africa shows that a whopping sum of 100 billion dollars in cash was stolen by the former president of Libya, out of which one billion dollars was held in two banks in South Africa.
Reporting how the oil economy of Lib¬ya was managed, Professor Shaul Gab¬bay presents a little summary. “There was of course no transparency and he and his family were dealing with the na¬tion’s wealth as if it was their own.”
No one knows, easily, what a presi¬dent stole until he leaves offi ce either voluntarily or he dies there. And in this regard, there are endless cases. If a president will steal one hundred billion dollars from oil money alone, as was the case with Libya, what type of price sta¬bility is anyone expecting?
Let us look at some not too diffi cult cases.
Until death took him away from of¬fi ce in June 1998, General Sani Abacha, who was born on 20th September 1943, was famous to the extent that he became Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. His record of stolen oil money is unequalled. The highlights include, for instance, the return of the sum of $700 million by the Swiss Government from the Abacha loot.
This is in addition to the confi scated, yet to be released to the federal govern¬ment, the sum of $640 million dollars in a single Swiss bank. Others include the $480million dollars returned by the US government to the Federal Government, There is also the return by the Jersey of the sum $316 million. The Supreme Court of Liechtenstein, by the priceless effort of Minister of Justice Adoke, recently returned 175 million Euro in addition to the $1 billion dollars returned in 2002. Prelimi¬nary data shows that the total sum of 3.2 trillion naira receipted by the Central Bank has been received so far.
That amount is about 75% equivalent of the cash backing of the Federal Gov¬ernment budget for the year 2015 without projection. I am too sure that Abacha did not transfer the money by himself. It is left for me to give compliments to those who assisted in the money transfers. They must be fi – nancial experts. We may not write beyond these introductions on Muammar Gadaffi and Mr. Sani Abacha out of respect for the dead. More impor¬tantly, after death, there is judgement.
One may ask again why we need the oil price to return to $120 dollars per barrel. Is it for good governance or for a great opportunity to steal more money from the oil wealth? The brief introduction below better explains the return time to $120 per barrel. It will return when the righteous are in government across the world, for when the unrighteous are in power, there will be pains in the land.
Let us get to business now!
Against the background of the world economy in 2015, the OECD has main¬tained a forecast of 1.8% in 2014 and a projected growth of 2.1% in 2015. China maintained 7.4% and 7.2% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, with no major change in Indian growth of 5.5% and5.8% in both the year 2014 and 2015 respectively.
The demand for oil is estimated to grow at 0.93mb/d to average around 91.13mb/d. A decline of 0.12mb/d is no¬ticed for the year 2015. This is as a result of lower -than-expected consumption in the OECD countries for 2015. World oil demand is expected to grow by around 1.2mb/d, some 70mb/d lower than the estimated in the last report of OPEC. World oil demand is expected to reach 92’26mb/d in 2015.
There are many factors that account for low oil prices and we also have key indicators to know in reasonable time that the prices of oil will go up. These are key drivers of the fortune of oil prices in the international market. Besides the power play of the major power block in the form of pressure groups like OPEC, certain counties are almost too certain of the capacity of their oil to feed them, notwithstanding the price indicators in the market. The coordination at this present time requires innovation in the strategic road map for OPEC. For in¬stance, nations continue to count their blessings and challenges in the retainer-ship of the membership of OPEC. So also negotiations are on to ensure that certain countries play alone and disengage their membership of OPEC. These are clearly hard times for OPEC members and how far they are able to manage these will de¬termine their future. I don’t want to say it is hard to succeed for any organisation in which the United States is not playing a major role at that level of international politics.
The movements of the price of crude oil, as reported by OPEC, signifi es that the reference basket fi nished down $9.40 at $75.57 in November of 2014, and with increasing supply and sluggish global growth, ICE Brent fell at $8.42 to $79.63/b, while Nymet Witi lost to stand at$75.81/b.
America is expected to drive oil supply growth in the world in 2015 next to Latin America. Non OPEC oil supply is expect¬ed to increase by 1.3mb/d to average of 57.31mb/d.
A drop of 30.5mb/d is already noticed in the output supply of OPEC in Novem¬ber of 2014, which is expected to con¬tinue. We all know as a fact that output cut remains a common strategy used by OPEC in regulating the market. The vol¬ume of increase of 57.31mb/d in the out-put supply of non OPEC members, par¬ticularly America and Latin America, is a threat to the oil volume expected from OPEC in a saturated market.
The implication is a continuous drop in price, which can only be arrested by natural consequences. There is nothing suggesting that the increase in the vol¬ume of oil recorded by the non OPEC members will not continue in the imme¬diate future. Available data in relation to the supply increase volume of OPEC is not encouraging. For instance, in 2014, the estimated increase recorded in vol¬ume of supply stood at 29.4mb/d, while in 2015, the required OPEC crude is fore¬cast at 28.9mb/d.
These are clearly hard times for OPEC members and how far they are able to manage these hard times will determine their future. I don’t want to say it’s hard for any organisation in which the United States is not playing a major role at that level of international politics to succeed.
The movement of the price of crude oil, as reported by OPEC, signifi es that the reference basket fi nished down $9.40 at $75.57 in November of 2014. And with increasing supply and sluggish global growth, ICE Brent fell at $8.42 to $79.63/b, while Nymet Witi lost to stand at $75.81/b.
America is expected to drive oil supply growth in the world in 2015, next to Latin America. Non OPEC oil supply is expected to increase by 1.3mb/d to an average of 57.31mb/d.
A drop of 30.5mb/d was already noticed in the output of OPEC in November of 2014, which is expected to continue. We all know for a fact that output cut remains a common strategy used by OPEC in regulating the market.
The volume increase of 57.31mb/d in the output supply of non OPEC members, particularly America and Latin America, is a threat to the oil volume expected from OPEC in a saturated market. The implication is a continuous drop in price, which can only be arrested by natural consequences. There is nothing suggesting that the increase in the volume of oil recorded by non OPEC members will not continue in the immediate future. Available data in relation to the increase in supply volume of OPEC is not encouraging. For instance, in 2014 the estimated increase recorded in volume of supply stood at 29.4mb/d, while in 2015, the required OPEC crude is forecast at 28.9mb/d.
It was in January 1970 that the price of oil constituted a signifi cant concern in the world market. Even then, it was not until 1973/1974 that a movement of $5 to $10 per barrel was recorded. The increase in price as at that time was determined majorly by the signifi – cant role played by the Arab embargo of that time. A major and sharp drop in supply was critical to the rising prices. And for as long as Saudi Arabia abandoned the swing producer role, the correspondent adjustment in the price of oil was of arithmetical progression.
What could be a major factor determining a rise in oil price was the consequential effect of the Iranian war, which was felt in rising oil prices between 1979 and the peak of the Iran and Iraq war in 1981, when the price of oil reached $38 dollars per barrel? This time in history was when Nigeria recorded her oil boom, specifi cally in 1973. During the Arab oil embargos, Nigeria took major advantage of the oil embargo and the economy recorded a major shift from agriculture as the major source of revenue of the federal government.
Nigeria became the young billionaire in the comity of nations, joining the Parish Club. And like a young billionaire, a very fi rst termer in the club, money was not indeed Nigeria’s problem, but how to spend it.
For good ten years, Nigeria enjoyed relative stability in oil prices and the boom appeared to be celebrated. The sanction of abandoning Saudi Arabian oil continued for such a long time to the advantage of many countries that continued to celebrate or build wealth around the happenings of that time. Between 1978 and 90, and just before the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the price of oil was as low as $15 dollars or as high as $20 dollars per barrel.
One major signifi cant event that moved the price of oil forward was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, when the price of oil went as high as $37 dollars per barrel. This lasted until 1991. And that was why the military could secure suffi cient money to carry out major projects, including the construction of the Federal Capital Territory and the Third Mainland Bridge under the Babangida administration. The Buhari administration then was also able to construct, within a short time, the Lagos/ Epe Express way. Between 1992 and 1999, there was no signifi cant change in the price of oil. And in those years, there were major preparations for the great recession in the Asian economy. The price went as low as $18 dollars in 1999.
There appears to have been a progressive management of oil prices after the end of the great Asian economic recession of 1999, as OPEC reacted to low prices of petroleum products. The strategic road map adopted was to cut production to accelerate a rise in the price of oil. And this strategy worked so well, except for September 11 (2001) when the price came down to a little below $20 dollars.
The price of oil, after the intervention of OPEC in 1999, was on the rise. For instance, it went as high as $25 dollars before September 11. And specifi cally between 2002 and 2006, there was stable arithmetical progression in the price of oil across the world, going as high as $45 dollars per barrel at a point. OPEC’s output cut and quota system appeared to work very well in maintaining reasonable stability at the international market.
The problem with Nigeria at this time was meeting quota allocation from OPEC. This was largely because of the crises in the Niger Delta areas, the hub of oil production. The oil producing communities were at that time involved in an insurgency to drive their demands for basic social welfare and fair play.
The Nigerian government adopted very many strategies for the management of the insurgency, which included, among others, participatory approach, community service development among oil producing companies and some form of direct intervention projects. There was no major victory recorded until President Yar’adua introduced amnesty for guns programme and created the Ministry of Niger Delta to account for direct impact of intervention in relation to development programmes in the affected areas.
The economy was signifi cantly managed before these interventions and the gun exchange deals. Government was more focused on innovation strategies and quality spending. There were innovations in the banking and telecommunication sectors, strategic development of new entrepreneurs and privatisation of government assets that were of signifi cant liability in the hands of government.
Apart from strategic savings, Nigeria for the period of eight years was not insolvent and exchange rate stability was achieved via disciplined fi scal policies of the Federal Government. Direct foreign investment was on the increase and a whopping sum of over 12 billion dollars was paid as debt, thereby increasing the Nigeria’s rating to B+ B+ AND B. Certain delegated accounts were set up and a bench mark was put in place for rainy days. The strategic road map was to reduce corruption, create an enabling environment and develop indigenous presence in business in the middle terms.
While saving was a continuous process of wealth creation, government strategic partnership of building infrastructures was a major achievement that was yielding results.
African integration was not left behind. One major achievement of that government was the reforms in the public sector. There was need to reduce the public service to a reasonable level of quality people. All areas of wastage were not spared by the government, such that benefi ts were monetised towards containment of wasteful expenditure. The level of wastage was therefore drastically reduced.
Many events contributed to the increase in oil prices that characterised 2006 to 2009, and those events occurred in quick succession. The events include the PDVSA workers’ strike in Venezuela and the anticipation of war in Iran in 2006, which alone increased the price of oil to a little above $60 per barrel. The bad weather created by the movement of Hurricane Ivan in the Gulf of Mexico also drove the price close to$65 per barrel. These increases in the price of oil were as a result of cuts in output, arising from intervening events of natural consequences. The inventory adjustment brought the price down again to$55 per barrel. Further adjustment in price was again accelerated by market forces, which was encouraged by Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina and Rita in the Gulf of Mexico. By this time, the price of oil had moved to well over $82 per barrel. So in 2008, Nigeria was making more money from the increase in the price of oil.
Even though the season of hurricanes did not last for more than one year, the effect on the price of oil was signifi cant, as it moved from$80 dollars per barrel to over $100 dollars per barrel. This was more than the cumulative gain in price increase in the last fi ve years!
In 2007 and 2008, Nigeria experienced challenges in meeting the allocation of supply to the international market. This cut in output signifi cantly led again to further increase in the price of oil. It moved to a little above $120. Again, rising demand in spite of the cut in the output of Nigerian oil, low spare capacity and weak international currency (arising from the bailout policy of the American Government in the management of the economy during the 2009 recession) made the price of oil to reach the peak of over $120.
In 2009, the economic recession manifested to such an extent that the signals created in 2008 become reality. The reality was that the recession would stay longer than necessary. The price of oil began to drop with geometric progression as a result of no cut in output combined with weak currency.
The US dollar fell against all other currencies. The Pound lost considerable value against all other currencies. Interest rate came down to l% in the US and 0.5% in England. Economic policies introduced in both countries were very competitive. For instance, in America, there were major job losses and government was interested in the protection of jobs. The introduction of the bailout policy became handy and there were potential demands in the hands of the government from major companies that required urgent attention. The Federal Reserve Bank had to make major decisions in creating more money by printing.
Ford Motors, for instance, needed about one trillion dollars or face liquidation, while A & G Insurance needed about half a trillion dollars in a matter of days. The American government resorted to printing more money, and about two to three trillion was printed as additional money to arrest the situation.
The fact that the home equity line of credit became due was also a critical challenge to economic recovery. Several trillions of dollars were trapped with the home equity line of credit. And with the value of property coming down in addition to the loss of jobs and the near collapse of the capital market, the various Central Banks had a huge task at hand in working a way out of the crises. The cumulative effect was the sharp drop in oil prices in the international market, which cumulated into almost thirty years loss of already gained prices. For instance, what was already over $120 per barrel fell to $40 dollars in less than fi ve years. That was the price of oil in 1984!
In England, the situation was not better than what was happening in America, as the interest rate came down to 0.5% and the government had to introduce qualitative easing as a way of managing the economy. More money was printed and deposited in banks to prevent systemic failure arising from liquidity crises in the banks. The policy was majorly to protect the banks from failure. Again, a whooping sum running into several billions of pounds was spent on buying toxic assets of the banks by the Bank of England. Generally the price of oil in the international market dropped.
Positive movement in the price of oil was noticed again in 2010 after the downward movement of 2009. Prices started moving from $40 per barrel geometrically to as much as $62 per barrel in 2010. The acceleration in prices during this period was a function of the Arab spring. Weather condition also played a signifi cant role in price increase. Most countries, including Nigeria, had improved on output, thereby benefi ting from the accelerated price increase. The situation was further improved with price adjustment by the Iran sanction, which created heavy demand for a rather scarce product.
Between 2011 and 2012, the price of oil moved upward to close to $100 per barrel. With strategic thinking and innovation, countries like Nigeria could have laid a good foundation for better days ahead. The movement in the price of oil was not sudden, such that there was no suffi cient time for planning. It was not enough to look into distribution of surplus income without connecting the future. For instance, only a few days ago, the Saudi Arabian government in anticipation of further depletion in oil prices released a whopping sum of 780 billion dollars from the reserve to support fl uctuating oil prices.
Only natural consequences or ineffi ciency of production can prevent America from leading the supply of oil in 2015. It appears that OPEC is hoping America will lack the effi ciency of supply necessary to push the price of oil down. OPEC is hopeful that technical problems arising from the supply of the required number of rigs to push adequate production will constitute a setback for America in maintaining the required volume of supply needed to create a signifi cant drop in oil price.
The ambition of America to lead oil production over a long term and determine the international price of oil requires more global strategy. For instance, before the launching of the attack on oil prices, all technical matters relating to production should have been resolved.
America must not forget that there are great advantages in the effi ciency of supply gained by OPEC arising from the commulative technical support of member countries. A huge amount of money and time is required for acquisition of technology and knowledge, as well as for development if America is to achieve her long term goal. American strategies in this regard also require massive innovation. America’s strategy of selective market, evident in the approach of purchasing oil from certain countries and abandoning Nigeria’s oil is a precooked strategy, which, in my opinion, may not produce tangible results at this time. Instead, America could assure Nigeria of massive purchase of her oil, guarantee her increase in supply at reduce price, in addition to other forms of assistance that could talk Nigeria out of OPEC.
Three major factors may constitute a setback in the desire of America to bring down the price of oil in addition to the usually unknown natural consequences. Those three factors are technical effi ciency, lack of global strategy, and improved demand capable of arresting the surplus.
OECD supply continues to be on the increase, with supply increase of about 23.26 mb/d in the last quarter. Increase of total output of OECD in November alone stood at 80tb/d. The trend shows that barring technical ineffi ciency, the increase in output will continue in 2015. The implication is that America OECD is the driver of oil supply in the international market. The threat in this is that if OECD supply is maintained, international prices of oil will begin to decline, as we have noticed in the early months of 2015. And it does not matter if OPEC competes with supply volume. It can only maintain, at best, price stability. Even then, the price of oil will be forced to come down the moment OECD increases output further.
What we have noticed is that the threat of OECD to the market is manifesting and is capable of further dangerous manifestation. We have already noticed that there may be initial set back in the effi ciency of supply on the part of OECD. It is, however, established beyond doubt, that such manifested problems will be resolved in not too long a time. The need for OPEC to fund a fundamental strategic response to the new development is key, otherwise it will sadly have to maintain the price of oil at ridiculously low ebb when OECD stabilises on the technical effi – ciency needed to drive supply.
The year 2014 was signifi cant for the economy of the United States, as the country witnessed the highest volume of increase in oil production. That year alone, and in the US alone, an increase of 1.45mb/b was recorded to be the largest growth among non OPEC countries. That alone is almost ten percent of the total volume increase in the oil supply of OECD, including Canada. Total supply volume increase of OECD was put at 19.82% that year alone. The immediate advantage of the increase in supply for the US was to gain revenue by withdrawing from the purchase or reduce supply from some OPEC countries including Nigeria and providing assistance to other OPEC countries like Mexico by the takeover of some supply needs of those countries.
The dangerous signal that calls for Nigeria’s attention is the fact that if the output of OECD and the US continue to increase as we have certainly noticed (and as they apparently will), Nigeria’s oil could easily go for as low as, or even less than $30per barrel. The only thing that can make this impossible is if natural factors arrest the increased output of OECD and America. Another factor that could make this impossible is ineffi ciency of supply by OECD. And we will be standing on a dangerous fi nancial lane to bank on any of these factors. The temporary increase in the price of oil is as temporary as the weather or the ineffi ciency of production of OECD. The gathering storm is dangerous. Nigeria’s government must take notice of and react to this trend.
The immediate effect of all these is already with us. The fi rst casualty is the Naira losing 25% value in less than two weeks. What can the Central Bank do? The volume of Dollars available to support the Naira when oil was selling for $120 per barrel was much. Now that it is selling for $60 Dollars per barrel, the volume of Dollars available to support the Naira has naturally dropped. So what will defend or support the Naira? If we do not have suffi cient Dollars to support the Naira, what do you think will drive value of investment in the stock market? ………
If the price of oil moves up and we have more Dollars as a result of the proceeds accruing from the sales of oil at higher prices (not a likely scenario!) the Naira will immediately appreciate and the Central Bank will resume her majestic declarations. If that does not happen, we can only look on. You certainly cannot regulate what you do not control!
It is interesting to hear all the talk about Agriculture. Everyone is saying ‘let’s diversify the economy and plant more cocoa etc.’ Very welcome development! But if we plant cocoa today, how long will it take to harvest, prepare the produce for the international commodity market and make the volume of Dollars that will support the Naira. That may sound like a good long term measure, but it must be said that we also need global strategy to compete effectively if we are to be a big player in that respect.
Presently, we need innovative strategy that can bail us out to arrest a free fall. If this was the corporate world, what we would do is stand at competitive advantage by using our capabilities to confront the challenges and build innovative strategy. This would be to go to a dollar based economy and set up our companies or regional branches to increase our dollar earning directly.
The simple question in management meetings would be, ‘how can we earn more dollars?’ And the simple answer would be, ‘invest directly in dollar economy and earn dollar directly.’ The force to be confronted in doing this is the big pocket. There is no barrier to entry.
How can government handle this? What sort of question can be asked at cabinet meetings? The President simply asks, ‘how can we react to the decline in major revenue? Where are the alternatives to get more foreign exchange?’ The Minister of Finance and the Coordinator of the Economy will likely respond. That answer must be coming from the resolutions of the ‘meetings before meeting’ of the Finance Minister with the Central Bank Governor and the Economic Management Team.
I have very high esteem and respect for the knowledge and achievements of the Minister of Finance and her capacity to give very useful responses to such questions at cabinet meetings. I am too certain that the response will be close to what anyone would do at the international level. A doctorate degree from Harvard is not a joke! It is a knowledge privilege. We are lucky that she brought scholarship to bear. When things are like this, local degree holders who become professors without international publications will also say what they know from their anti clockwise thinking. What does one expect from a dog in fashion or a dog backing without teeth? We expect some sort of boohoo cry here! (I will, on a later date, react to the debate between Soludo and Okonjo-Iweala)
We continue to notice major decline in the value of Ice Bent, which was recorded to have lost 39% value. So also Nymax. WTI in November 2014 lost 10.1% value in the international market. The reason for the loss in value is largely associated with heavy supply of the products from North America. The cumulative effect of which is in the fact that the economy is not gathering suffi cient momentum and is somewhat decelerating. The decision of the OECD to maintain supply level at30mb/b led to the drop in the price of oil products in the last quarter of last year. And should this trend continue, it goes to justify our earlier position of the diffi – culties of OPEC in reacting to supply problems.
As long as America takes charge of oil production, the dollar will remain very strong against other currencies and this will deliver a very strong economy to America. Regrettably, the Euro has not proven to be an alternative to the dollar even when it was intended.
The chances that oil price will return to the famous $120 per barrel too soon is the tallest dream of the century. For the fi rst time, OPEC will be confronted with the challenges of this time and the need to roll out more unknown strategy is important to recovery. It is left for me to say that both the OECD and OPEC can be fused (almost impossible) to be one world body that will take charge of oil matters in the world. The fusion will help to confront the challenges. What we can say for now is that the division between the two will, sooner than later, drop the price of oil to about or less than $30 dollars per barrel. God forbid! By Dr. Jimoh Ibrahim, CFR GMD, Energy Group